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31. Introduction
This paper presents an empirical analysis of optimal taxation, adopting Equality of Opportunity (EOp)
as the evaluation criterion.
The EOp-criterion is a computable concept of equality of opportunity developed by Roemer
(1998). This concept is interesting from the policy point-of-view, since the majority of citizens in most
industrialised countries, although not unfavourable to redistribution, seem sensitive to the way that a
certain outcome has been attained. Redistribution is more likely to receive support if it is designed to
correct circumstances that are beyond people’s control. On the other hand, if a bad outcome is
associated with a lack of effort, redistribution will be much less acceptable.
In a previous contribution that originated from an international research project, this concept
has been applied to evaluate the EOp performance of income tax rules in various countries, using a
relatively simple common model of labour supply behaviour with calibrated parameters1. This paper
extends the previous study in several respects. First, to allow for alternative weighting profiles in the
treatment of income differentials that arise from factors beyond the individuals' control, a generalised
version of Roemer’s (1998) EOp-criterion is introduced. Secondly, we employ a relatively
sophisticated model of labour supply that provides a simultaneous treatment of partners’ decisions and
accounts for quantity constraints on the distribution of hours. Finally, while the previous study only
concerned male heads of household's 25-40 years old this study deals with approximately the entire
labour force.
In Section 2 we briefly discuss the justification and definition of the EOp-criterion and its
relationship to more traditional concepts of social welfare, where the concern focuses upon the
equality of outcome (EO) criterion rather than equality of opportunity. In the same section we also
explain how the EOp-criterion can be generalised to take into account inequality in outcomes that do
not arise from unequal opportunities.
In Section 3 we use a microeconometric model of household labour supply, estimated on
1993 Italian data, to simulate the effects of various constant-revenue affine tax rules, i.e. the tax rules
defined by a lump-sum transfer (positive or negative) and a constant marginal tax rate that produces
the same revenue collected with the observed 1993 rule. These tax rules are evaluated and compared
according to the generalised EOp-criterion. Furthermore, the EOp-optimal tax rule is also identified.
In Section 4 we perform a similar exercise as in Section 3, but looking at the class of tax-
rules defined by a transfer and two tax rates (instead of one as for the affine rules). In Section 5 we
1 See Roemer et al. (2001).
4compare the evaluation of tax rules according the EOp and EO criteria. Section 6 summarises the main
results. Appendixes A, B and C give essential information on the microeconometric model, on the
dataset, and on the 1993 tax rule.
2. The EO and EOp criteria
The standard approach in evaluating tax systems is to employ a social objective (welfare) function as
the basic evaluating instrument. This function is commonly used to summarise the changes in (adult-
equivalent) incomes resulting from introducing various alternatives to the actual tax system in a
country. The simplest way to summarise the changes that take place is to add up the income
differentials, implying that individuals are given equal welfare weights independently of whether they
are poor or rich. However, if besides total welfare we also care about the distributional consequences
of a tax system, then an alternative to the linear additive welfare function is required. In this paper we
rely on the rank-dependent social welfare functions that have their origin from Mehran (1976) and
Yaari (1988)2 and are defined by
(2.1)
1
1
0
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where F-1 is the left inverse of the cumulative distribution function of (adult-equivalent) income with
mean µ, and pk(t) is a weight function defined by
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Note that the inequality aversion exhibited by Wk decreases with increasing k. As ,→ ∞ kk W
approaches inequality neutrality and coincides with the linear additive welfare function defined by
(2.3)
1
1
0
( ) .µ−
∞
= =∫W F t dt
It follows by straightforward calculations that µ≤kW for all j and that Wk is equal to the mean µ for
finite k if and only if F is the egalitarian distribution. Thus, Wk can be interpreted as the equally
2 Several other authors have discussed rationales for this approach, see e.g. Sen (1974), Hey and Lambert (1980), Donaldson
and Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1992) and Aaberge (2001).
5distributed (equivalent) level of equivalent income. As recognised by Yaari (1988) this property
suggests that Ik, defined by
(2.4) 1 , 1, 2,...
µ
= − =
k
k
W
I k
can be used as a summary measure of inequality and moreover is a member of the “illfare-ranked
single-series Ginis” class introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980). As noted by Aaberge
(2000), I1 is actually equivalent to a measure of inequality that was proposed by Bonferroni (1930),
whilst I2 is the Gini coefficient.3
Note that each of the welfare functions W1, W2, and W3 and the corresponding measures of
inequality (I1, I2, and I3) exhibit aversion to inequality and thus obey the Pigou-Dalton principle of
transfers. The essential difference between these welfare functions and the corresponding measures of
inequality is revealed by their transfer sensitivity properties. When the transfer sensitivity is judged
according to Kolm’s principle of diminishing transfers it follows from Aaberge (2000) that I1, I2, and
I3 assign more weight to transfers between persons with a given income difference if these incomes are
lower than if they are higher only for income distributions that are members of certain families of
distributions. The I-coefficient satisfies the principle of diminishing transfers for log-concave
distribution functions, whilst I2 and I3 satisfy this transfer principle for distributions (F) that are strictly
concave and F2 is strictly concave, respectively. By contrast, when we rely on Mehran’s principle of
positional transfer sensitivity rather than on the principle of diminishing transfers the results of
Aaberge (2000) show that I1 satisfies this principle for all distribution functions, whereas I2 and I3 do
not. Note that the principle of positional transfer sensitivity differs from the principle of diminishing
transfers by requiring a fixed difference in ranks rather than a fixed difference in incomes. In this case
the Gini coefficient (I2) attaches an equal weight to a given transfer irrespective of whether it takes
place at the lower, the middle or the upper part of the income distribution, whilst I3 assigns more
weight to transfers at the upper than at the middle and the lower part of the income distribution.
Roughly speaking, this means that I1 exhibits very high downside inequality aversion and is
particularly sensitive to changes that concern the poor part of the population, whilst I2 normally pays
more attention to changes that take place in the middle part of the income distribution. The I3-
coefficient exhibits upside inequality aversion and is thus particularly sensitive to changes that occur
in the upper part of the income distribution.
3 For further discussion of the family { }: 1, 2,...=kI k of inequality measures we refer to Mehran (1976), Donaldson and
Weymark (1980, 1983), Bossert (1990) and Aaberge (2000).
6For a given sum of incomes the welfare functions W1, W2, and W3 take their maximum value
when everyone receives the same income and may thus be interpreted as EO-criteria (equality of
outcome) when employed as a measure for judging between tax systems.
However, as indicated by Roemer (1998) the EO-criterion is controversial and suffers from
the drawback of receiving little support among citizens in a nation.4 This is due to the fact that
differences in outcomes resulting from differences in efforts are, by many, considered ethically
acceptable and thus should not be the target of a redistribution policy. An egalitarian redistribution
policy should instead seek to equalise those income differentials arising from factors beyond the
control of the individual. Thus, not only the outcome, but its origin and how it was obtained, matters.
This is the essential idea behind Roemer’s (1998) theory of equality of opportunity, where people are
supposed to differ with respect to circumstances, which are attributes of the environment of the
individual that influence her earning potential, and which are “beyond her control”.
This study defines circumstances by family background, and classifies the individuals into
three types according to father's years of education:
• less than 5 years (Type 1),
• 5-8 years (Type 2), and
• more than 8 years (Type 3).
Assume that 1( )−jF t is the income level of the individual located at the tth quantile of the
income distribution (Fj) of type j. The differences in incomes within each type are assumed to be due
to different degrees of effort for which the individual is to be held responsible, whereas income
differences that may be traced back to family background are considered to be beyond the control of
the individual. As indicated by Roemer (1998) this suggests that we may measure a person’s effort by
the quantile of the income distribution where he is located. Next, Roemer declares that two individuals
in different types have expended the same degree of effort if they have identical positions (rank) in the
income distribution of their type. Thus, an EOp (Equality of Opportunity) tax policy should aim at
designing a tax system such that 1min ( )−jF t is maximised for each quantile t. However, since this
criterion is rather demanding and in most cases will not produce a complete ordering of the tax
systems under consideration a weaker ranking criterion is required. To this end Roemer (1998)
proposes to employ as the social objective the average of the lowest income at each quantile,
(2.5)
1
1
0
min ( )−
∞
= ∫% jjW F t dt
4 See also Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Arneson (1989, 1990), Cohen (1989) and Roemer (1993).
7Thus,
∞
%W ignores income differences within types and is solely concerned about differences that arise
from differential circumstances. By contrast, the EO criteria defined by (2.1) does not distinguish
between the different sources that contribute to income inequality. As an alternative to (2.1) and (2.5)
we introduce the following extended family of EOp welfare functions,
(2.6)
1
1
0
( ) min ( ) , 1,2,...,−= =∫%k k jjW p t F t dt k
where pk(t) is defined by (2.2).
The essential difference between %kW and ∞%W is that %kW gives increasing weight to the
welfare of lower quantiles in the type-distributions. Thus, in this respect %kW captures also an aspect of
inequality within types. As explained above, the concern for within type inequality is greatest for the
most disadvantaged type, i.e. for the type that forms the largest segment(s) of [ ]{ }1min ( ) : 0,1− ∈jj F t t .
Note that 1min ( )−ii F t defines the inverse of the following cumulative distribution function
( )%F
(2.7) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1( ) Pr ( ) Pr min ( ) 1 1 ( ) ,− −= ≤ = ≤ = − −∏% % i ii iF x F T x F T x F x
where T is a random variable with uniform distribution function (defined on [0,1]). Thus, we may
decompose the EOp welfare functions %kW as we did the EOp welfare functions Wk. Accordingly, we
have that
(2.8) ( )1 , 1,2,...∞= − =% % %k kW W I k
where %kI , defined by
(2.9) 1 , 1,2,...
∞
= − =
%% %
k
k
W
I k
W
is a summary measure of inequality for the mixture distribution %F .
Expression (2.8) demonstrates that the EOp welfare functions %kW for < ∞k take into
account value judgements about the trade-off between the mean income and the inequality in the
distribution of income for the most EOp disadvantaged people. Thus, %kW may be considered as an
inequality within type adjusted version of the pure EOp welfare function that was introduced by
8Roemer (1998). As explained above, the concern for within type inequality is greatest for the most
disadvantaged type, i.e. for the type that forms the largest segment(s) of the mixture distribution %F .
Alternatively, %kW for < ∞k may be interpreted as an EOp welfare function that, in contrast to ∞%W ,
gives increasing weight to individuals who occupy low effort quantiles.
3. Microeconometric simulation of tax reforms
The purpose of this section is to make an EOp evaluation of the 1993 Italian tax system and various
alternative two-parameter and three-parameter tax rules under the constraint of fixed tax revenue. To
this end we employ the labour supply model(s) and simulation framework explained in Appendix A to
simulate the labour supply behavior of single females, single males, and couples that are between 18
and 54 years old. To capture the heterogeneity in preferences we have estimated three separate models
of labour supply: one for single females, one for single males and one for couples. Note, however, that
the condition of tax revenue neutrality concerns the total population of individuals at the ages between
18 and 54. Thus, the tax paid by each of the groups is treated as an endogenous variable in the
simulation exercises. The main features of the 1993 tax rule are briefly illustrated in Appendix C.
The tax reform simulations consist of five main steps:
1. The tax rule is applied to individual earners’ gross incomes in order to obtain disposable incomes.
New labour supply responses in view of a new tax rule are taken into account by the household
labour supply models for singles and couples briefly described in Appendix A. The computation
of taxes is made under the conditions of unchanging total tax revenue and non-negative disposable
household incomes.
2. To each decision making individual between 18 and 54 years old, an equivalent income is
imputed, computed as total disposable household income divided by the square root of the number
of household members.
3. We then build the individual equivalent income distributions F1, F2 and F3 for the types defined
according to parental (actually father’s) education: less than 5 years (type 1), 5-8 years (type 2)
and more than 8 years (type 3).
4. Finally, we compute %kW for 1,2,3=k and ∞ .
5. Optimization is performed by iterating the above steps, in order to find the tax rule that produces
the highest value of %kW for each value of k under the constraint of unchanged tax revenue,
provided that the tax rule is a member of certain sets of two- and three-parameter tax rules.
93.1. EOp-evaluation of alternative two-parameter tax rules
The alternative two-parameter tax rules are of the following type: (1 )= + −x c t y , where
y = gross income,
x = disposable income,
c = lump-sum transfer (positive or negative), and
t = constant marginal tax rate.
Note that the income and tax figures below are measured in 1000 ITL. The results of the two-
parameter tax reform simulations are summarised in Tables 1 and 2 and in Figure 1.
Table 1. EOp-optimal two-parameter tax systems under various social objective criteria ( )%kW
k 1 2 3 ∞
marginal tax rate, t .774 .637 0 0
lump-sum tax/transfer, c 11,500 9,500 -5,790 -5,790
Table 1 presents the EOp-optimal affine tax rules for different values of k, i.e. for different degrees of
concern for within type inequality. Recall that the higher is k, the lower is the concern for within type
inequality.
Table 1 presents the EOp-optimal affine tax rules for different values of k, i.e. for different
degrees of concern for within type inequality. Recall that the higher is k, the lower is the concern for
within type inequality.
As demonstrated by Table 1 the optimal policy is very sensitive to the value of k. For 3≥k ,
the EOp-optimal tax rule is the pure lump-sum tax (i.e. 0=t and 0<c ) whereas for 2≤k the optimal
tax rule consists of a very high marginal tax rate and a positive lump-sum transfer. An implication is
that the concern for the equality of opportunity by itself does not imply high marginal tax rates. Only
if we also account for within type inequality, does the optimal policy entail high marginal tax rates.
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Figure 1. Distributions of observed equivalent income by type. 1000 ITL
Figure 2. Distributions of individual equivalent income by type under the EOp2(1) and EOp2(3)
tax systems. 1000 ITL
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Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 give more details. The grahps illustrate the equivalent income
distributions under the actual 1993 tax rule (Figure 1) and under the EOp-optimal rules for 1=k and
3≥k (Figure 2). Table 2 reports the value of the EOp criterion for different tax rules. In particular, we
focus on the comparison between the observed rule (1993), the pure flat tax (a theoretical benchmark),
and the three linear rules that are EOp optimal under different values of k. In each column (i.e. for
each k) the bold figure is the maximised value of the EOp criterion, i.e. it corresponds to the EOp-
optimal tax rule. EOp2(r) denotes the EOp-optimal affine tax rule when =k r .
Table 2. EOp-performance ( )%kW of the 1993 tax system, a flat tax system and three different
EOp-optimal two-parameter tax systems
k
Tax system
Social objective
function
( )%kW
1 2 3 ∞
1993 tax system 10,523 12,797 13,893 18,323
Flat tax .1810
=  
= 
t
c
10,834 13,496 14,823 20,449
EOp2 (1) .77411,500
=  
= 
t
c
12,661 13,652 14,077 15,641
EOp2 (2) .6379,500
=  
= 
t
c
12,406 13,660 14,237 16,486
EOp2 (3) 05,790
=  
= − 
t
c
9,942 13,270 14,992 22,231
Table 2 enables us to compare the EOp performance of the various rules for a given k (note that the
comparison only makes sense between elements of the same column). We can see that although the
flat tax is never EOp-optimal, for any value of k, it improves upon the observed 1993 rule. More
generally, one can always find an affine tax rule that is EOp-preferred to the observed 1993 one.
However, the direction along which one can find EOp-optimal tax rules depends crucially on the value
of k. If 1=k one has to move towards very high marginal tax rates (coupled with high transfers). If k
is greater than 1, then the EOp-optimal tax rules require lower marginal tax ratesand more revenue
collected through the lump-sum part of the tax. These aspects are further illustrated by Figure 3, where
we draw the curvein the (c,t) planeof the revenue-constant affine tax rules, and for any k we
indicate the sets of tax rules with a lower or with a higher EOp performance with respect to the
observed rule. As k increases the graphs in Figure 1 demonstrate that the more we reduce the marginal
12
tax rateand the more revenue we collect through lump-sum taxationthe better is the EOp-
performance.
The fact that the optimal tax rule is the pure lump-sum tax, provided that we do not put too
much weight on within type inequality, is a somewhat striking result in itself. After all, EOp is an
egalitarian criterion, and one would expect it to favour greater marginal taxation. How can we explain
this apparently counter-intuitive result? A possible explanation lies with the relatively high labour
supply response of the least advantaged individuals. Since the EOp-criterion requires the maximisation
of a weighted average of the incomes of the least advantaged type, and since the labour supply of these
individuals turns out to be very responsive to higher net wage rates, it follows that lower marginal tax
rates (or, in the limit, a marginal tax rate equal to 0) can in fact improve substantially the welfare of
this group. However, this effect may be counterbalanced if we are given enough weight (low value of
k) to low effort individuals. Table 4 gives some support to this argument by illustrating the labour
supply response of the different types when facing alternative tax rules. When the pure lump-sum tax
is applied, the labour supply (and therefore the available income) of type 1 (the most disadvantaged
group) increases much more (as percentage variation) than labour supply of types 2 or 3. To be sure, a
bias in favour of the lump-sum tax might be due to the fact that we equate income and welfare. When
accounting for the value of leisure (object of on-going research), the policy prescriptions might
change.
Table 3. Decomposition of EOp social welfare ( )%kW under the 1993 tax system, a flat tax system
and various EOp-optimal two-parameter tax systems
Measure of inequality
Tax system
∞
%W
1
%I 2%I 3%I
1993 tax system 18,323 .426 .302 .242
Flat tax .1810
=  
= 
t
c
20,449 .470 .340 .275
EOp2 (1) .77411,500
=  
= 
t
c
15,642 .191 .127 .100
EOp2 (2) .6379,500
=  
= 
t
c
16,486 .247 .171 .136
EOp2 (3) 05,790
=  
= − 
t
c
22,231 .553 .403 .326
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Figure 3. Sets of revenue constant affine tax systems under different EOp welfare criteria ( )%kW
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Table 4. Labour supply by types under different tax systems*
Type
Tax system All
1 2 3
1993 tax system 1383 1279 1383 1469
Flat tax .1810
=  
= 
t
c
1391 (+0.58) 1369 (+7.04) 1362 (+1.52) 1471 (+0.14)
EOp2 (1) .77411,500
=  
= 
t
c
1095 (-20.82) 1109 (-13.29) 1087 (-21.40) 1100 (-25.12)
EOp2 (2) .6379,500
=  
= 
t
c
1160 (-16.12) 1142 (-10.71) 1148 (-16.99) 1200 (-18.31)
EOp2 (3) 05,790
=  
= − 
t
c
1487 (+7.52) 1450 (+13.37) 1459 (+5.50) 1578 (+7.42)
*Percentage changes relative to the labour supply under the 1993 tax system in parentheses.
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What happens to specific groups of people under the EOp-optimal rules and in particular under the
pure lump-sum policy? Table 5 presents, for various subsamples, their composition in terms of EOp-
types, the average net observed income in 1993, and the change in average income when the lump-
sum rule is applied. The Table gives a more vivid understanding of the effects of the “reform” from
the viewpoints of efficiency and equality. All the subsamples on average gain. If we look at the gains
across types, we see that types 2 or 3 almost always gain proportionately more than type 1. However
this is not relevant from the point of view of the EOp criterion, according to which we only care about
what happens to the worst-off type for each quantile (in our case, in practice, this is type 1): under the
lump-sum rule, type 1 gains more than under the alternative rules; it does not matter if type 2 and 3
gain even more. Where do these gains come from? Clearly there are two (interdependent) channels,
higher net wages (in fact an agent gets the whole gross wage under the lump-sum rule) and higher
labour supply. The labour supply response is documented in Table 4. For example, we can compute
from Table 5 that overall average income increases by 54 per cent gross of the lump-sum tax of
5,790,000 ITL. Since the overall increase in labour supply amounts to 7.5 per cent (from Table 4), we
have a 46.5 per cent gain attributable to the increase in net wage and to the interaction between wage
and labour supply across the sample. We have seen that the lump-sum rule is outcome disequalizing
(Table 3). However we know that the generalised EOp index is only affected by the inequality among
the individuals belonging to the worst-off type. If we look at what is going on more generally in the
whole sample, the effect upon distribution is less clear-cut. For example, the poor gain much more
than the non-poor.
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Table 5. Relative proportions, mean observed individual (disposable equivalent) income ( )obsW
and changes in mean individual income ( )¥ obsW -W when the tax regime is changed to lump-
sum taxation by gender, family status, economic status (poverty) and family background (type).
In 1000 LIT
Household type (by family background)
Individual and
household
characteristics 1 2 3 All
Proportion (per cent) 20.3 54.7 25.0 100
Mean income 21,107 22,831 29,312 23,540All
Changes in mean
income 3,907 5,794 12,011 6,969
Proportion (per cent) 19.9 51.7 28.4 100
Mean income 22,369 28,480 34,046 28,843Single males
Changes in mean
income 3,210 7,013 7,343
6,350
Proportion (per cent) 15.8 51.7 32.6 100
Mean income 18,076 20,110 26,085 21,734Single females
Changes in mean
income 3,134 2,568 4,412 3,258
Proportion (per cent) 15.3 51.2 33.5 100
Mean income 24,377 28,613 33,913 29,741Two person households
Changes in mean
income 7,153 9,781 14,909 11,097
Proportion (per cent) 16.5 55.0 28.5 100
Mean income 20,091 24,795 29,050 25,235Three person
households
Changes in mean
income 4,678 5,066 14,333 7,648
Proportion (per cent) 23.5 55.8 20.7 100
Mean income 16,848 20,516 27,349 21,064Households with more
than three persons
Changes in mean
income 3,022 5,153 9,785 5,608
Proportion (per cent) 39.2 50.4 10.4 100
Mean income 7,235 7,720 7,424 7,500Poor individuals
Changes in mean
income 5,276 7,487 13,174 7,216
Proportion (per cent) 18.0 55.2 26.8 100
Mean income 21,320 24,541 30,368 25,528Non-poor individuals
Changes in mean
income 3,537 5,603 11,955 6,939
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3.2. EOp-evaluation of alternative three-parameter tax rules
One might suspect that the resultsin particular the EOp-optimality of a pure lump-sum tax for 3=k
or greaterare somewhat forced by the fact that we restrict the simulation to a unidimensional class of
tax rules. Since the disadvantaged individuals are more responsivein terms of labour supplythan
the rich and/or advantaged individuals, we should be able to improve upon the pure lump-sum tax or
upon the high marginal rate rules, by adopting a two-dimensional tax rule. Here we explore this policy
direction. The class of tax rules considered is defined as follows:
1
1 2
(1 ) if
(1 ) (1 )( ) if
c t y y y
x
c t y t y y y y
+ − ≤
= 
+ − + − − >
where
x = disposable income,
y = gross income,
y = average individual gross income in Italy on the survey year (1993).
With the revenue-neutral constraint the three-parameters ( )1 2, ,c t t define a two-dimensional
class of rules.
Table 6 reports the optimal three-parameter rules for different values of k. For example, for
1=k the optimal rule is defined by a transfer c = 12,500, a first marginal tax rate 1t = 0.856 and a
second marginal tax rate 2t = 0.776. By comparing Table 6 with Table 1, we see that the EOp-optimal
rules differ significantly depending on whether one considers a two-parameter (Table 1) or a three-
parameter rule (Table 6). When 1=k , the three-parameter EOp-optimal rule gives two very high tax
rates and a slightly regressive tax rate5, and a large positive transfer, inducing a net-vs-gross income
profile close to the ones implied by the Negative Income Tax schemes. The most marked differences
with respect to the two-parameter case are found when 2=k . While the two-parameter case called for
tax rate over 60 per cent coupled with a positive transfer of 9,500,000 ITL, the three-parameter case
entails two very different tax rates with a marked progressivity (from 25 per cent to 53 per cent) and a
much lower transfer (3,500,000 ITL). For any 3≥k , the two-parameter case chooses the pure lump-
sum tax as the EOp-optimal policy. When we use a three-parameter rule, with 3=k , we still have a
positive tax rate (17 per cent) for the higher incomes, coupled with a 3,500,000 ITL lump-sum tax.
However, when we employ the pure EOp-welfare function ( )= ∞k , we are back to the EOp-
optimality of the pure lump-sum tax.
5 Regressive in the sense that the marginal tax rate decreases with income.
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Table 7 is the analogue of Table 2 for the three-parameter rule. It shows the level of the EOp
social welfare function for different values of k and different tax rules, that is, the current 1993 rule
and the four EOp-optimal rules of Table 6, with EOp3(r) denoting the EOp-optimal three-parameter
tax rule when =k r .
Table 6. EOp-optimal three-parameter tax systems under various social objective criteria ( )%kW
k 1 2 3 ∞
t1 .856 .251 0 0
t2 .776 .531 .168 0
c 12,500 3,500 -3,500 -5,790
Table 7. EOp-performance ( )%kW of the 1993 tax system, a flat tax system and three different
EOp-optimal three-parameter tax systems
k
Tax system
Social objective
function
( )%kW
1 2 3 ∞
1993 tax system 10,523 12,797 13,893 18,323
EOp3 (1)
1
2
.856
.776
12,500
=  
=  
= 
t
t
c
12,685 13,606 13,988 15,393
EOp3 (2)
1
2
.251
.531
3,500
=  
=  
= 
t
t
c
11,769 13,822 14,789 18,508
EOp3 (3)
1
2
0
.168
3,500
=  
=  
= − 
t
t
c
10,636 13,649 15,135 21,156
EOp3 (∞) 1 2 05,790
= =  
= − 
t t
c
9,942 13,270 14,992 22,231
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Table 8. Decomposition of EOp social welfare ( )%kW under various three-parameter tax systems
Measure of inequality
Tax system
∞
%W
1
%I 2%I 3%I
1993 tax system 18,323 .426 .302 .242
EOp3 (1)
1
2
.856
.776
12,500
=  
=  
= 
t
t
c
15,393 .176 .116 .091
EOp3 (2)
1
2
.251
.531
3,500
=  
=  
= 
t
t
c
18,508 .364 .253 .201
EOp3 (3)
1
2
0
.168
3,500
=  
=  
= − 
t
t
c
21,156 .497 .355 .285
EOp3 (∞) 1 2 05,790
= =  
= − 
t t
c
22,231 .553 .403 .326
4. Comparison of empirical results based on EOp and EO criteria
In this section we focus upon the evaluation of the EOp-optimal policies (illustrated in sections 3 and
4) using the more traditional evaluation criterion of equality of outcome (EO criterion, see section 2).
Table 9 reports the EO-performance, that is, the level of the EO social welfare function (defined in
section 2) of five policies discussed above for various values of k. The policies are the observed 1993
tax rule, the flat tax, and the three EOp-optimal two-parameter rules for 1=k , 2=k and 3≥k . Table
10 shows the decomposition of the EO-criterion into the efficiency and the inequality terms. The
exercise is repeated, with similar results, for the EOp-optimal three-parameter tax rules (Tables 11 and
12). More generally, we have also searched for the EO-optimal rule within the whole classes of the
two-parameter and three-parameter tax rules, and it always turns out that the pure lump-sum tax is
optimal whatever the value of k. Thus, if we do not explicitly account for inequality between types in
the EOp-manner, the optimal policy always consists in a zero marginal tax rate (coupled with a
positive lump-sum tax), whatever the degree of inequality aversion. Table 12 clarifies that this result is
due to very large efficiency effects of the lump-tax rule, large enough to over-compensate the also
large inequality effects.
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Table 9. EO-performance ( )kW of the 1993 tax system, a flat tax system and three different
EOp-optimal two-parameter tax systems
k
Tax system
Social objective
function
( )kW
1 2 3 ∞
1993 tax system 13,747 16,586 17,967 23,540
Flat tax .1810
=  
= 
t
c
13,790 17,180 18,893 26,581
EOp2 (1) .77411,500
=  
= 
t
c
13,445 14,546 15,028 16,867
EOp2 (2) .6379,500
=  
= 
t
c
13,653 15,100 15,775 18,534
EOp2 (3) 05,790
=  
= − 
t
c
13,901 18,260 20,522 30,510
Table 10. Decomposition of social welfare ( )kW with respect to mean and income inequality
under the 1993 tax system, a flat tax system and various two-parameter tax systems
Measure of inequality
Tax system Mean income
1I 2I 3I
1993 tax system 23,540 .416 .295 .237
Flat tax .1810
=  
= 
t
c
26,581 .481 .354 .289
EOp2 (1) .77411,500
=  
= 
t
c
16,867 .203 .138 .109
EOp2 (2) .6379,500
=  
= 
t
c
18,534 .263 .185 .149
EOp2 (3) 05,790
=  
= − 
t
c
30,510 .544 .402 .327
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Table 11. EO-performance ( )kW of three different EOp-optimal three-parameter tax systems
k
Tax system
Social objective
function
( )kW
1 2 3 ∞
1993 tax system 13,747 16,586 17,967 23,540
EOp3 (1)
1
2
.856
.776
12,500
=  
=  
= 
t
t
c
13,361 14,400 14,846 16,560
EOp3 (2)
1
2
.251
.531
3,500
=  
=  
= 
t
t
c
13,660 16,010 17,119 21,477
EOp3 (3)
1
2
0
.168
3,500
=  
=  
= − 
t
t
c
13,825 17,577 19,455 27,573
EOp3 (∞) 1 2 05,790
= =  
= − 
t t
c
13,901 18,260 20,522 30,510
Table 12. Decomposition of social welfare ( )kW with respect to mean and income inequality
under different tax systems
Measure of inequality
Tax system Mean income I1 I2 I3
1993 tax system 23,540 .416 .295 .237
EOp3 (1)
1
2
.856
.776
12,500
=  
=  
= 
t
t
c
16,560 .193 .130 .104
EOp3 (2)
1
2
.251
.531
3,500
=  
=  
= 
t
t
c
21,477 .364 .255 .203
EOp3 (3)
1
2
0
.168
3,500
=  
=  
= − 
t
t
c
27,573 .499 .363 .294
EOp3 (∞) 1 2 05,790
= =  
= − 
t t
c
30,510 .544 .402 .327
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6. Conclusion
We have used a microeconometric model of household labour supply in Italy in order to simulate and
identify optimal tax rules within classes of two- and three-parameter tax rules when the criterion of
Equality of Opportunity as developed by Roemer (1998) defines the evaluation function. We have also
offered a generalisation of the EOp criterion that permits us to complement the pure EOp criterion
with a variable degree of aversion to inequality within types. A rather striking result is that the optimal
tax rule turns out to be the pure lump-sum tax, under the pure EOp criterion or with moderate (k
greater than 2) degrees of aversion to inequality within types. The result seems to depend on a
relatively high labour supply response from the most disadvantaged type: the labour supply
incentivesand the efficiency effects for the most disadvantagedgenerated by the pure lump-sum
tax are large enough to overcome the disequalising effects obtained within the population. A high
degree (k less than 2) of inequality aversion instead produces EOp-optimal rules with positive
marginal tax rates. On the other hand, when using the equality of outcome (EO) criterion, the pure
lump-sum tax always turns out to be optimal, at least with respect to the classes of two- and three-
parameter rules. Overall, the results do not conform with the perhaps common expectation that the EO
criterion is more supportive of “interventionist” (redistributive) policies than an EOp approach. On the
contrary, our data and our model indicate that EO never calls for redistribution, and only if an EOp
criterion is introduced may redistributive intervention through marginal tax rates be optimal depending
on the degree of social aversion to inequality. To be sure, the policy prescription might change if we
include the value of leisure in the measurement of individual welfare. For example, since under the
pure lump-sum tax people work (and earn) a lot more, it might be the case that, when account is taken
of their reduced leisure, the lump-sum tax is not so desirable. Including the value of leisure will be
pursued in future work, which is also needed to explore the performance of tax rules that are more
complex than the two- or three-parameter rules.
It also bears mentioning that we have constrained ourselves to announcing the same tax rule
to all citizens. If we allowed ourselves to offer different tax rules to different types, then we conjecture
that EOp optimization would require positive and high marginal tax rates for advantaged types and
lump-sum taxation for disadvantaged types. This type-differentiation of taxation is only very
imperfectly approximated by our three-parameter family of tax rules.
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Appendix A
The microeconometric model and the simulation procedure
The model used draws upon the framework introduced by Dagsvik (1994). The agents choose among
jobs, each job being defined by a wage rate w, hours of work h and other characteristics j. For
expository simplicity we consider in what follows a single person household, although the model we
estimate considers both singles and couples. The problem solved by the agent looks like the following:
(A.1) ( ) ( ), ,max , ,x h j BU x h j∈
under the budget constraint ( ), ,x f wh m= where
h = hours of work
w = gross wage rate
j = other job and/or household characteristics
m = gross exogenous income
x = disposable income
f(.,.) = tax rule that transforms gross incomes (wh,m) into net income x.
The set B is the opportunity set, i.e. it contains all the opportunities available to the household. For
generality we also include non-market opportunities into B; a non-market opportunity is a “job” with
0=w and 0=h . Agents can differ not only in their preferences and in their wage (as in the traditional
model) but also in the number of available jobs of different type. Note that for the same agent, wage
rates (unlike in the traditional model) can differ from job to job. As analysts we do not know exactly
what opportunities are contained in B. Therefore we use a probability density function to represent B.
Let us denote by ( , )p h w the density of jobs of type ( , ).h w By specifying a probability density function
on B we can for example allow for the fact that jobs with hours of work in a certain range are more or
less likely to be found, possibly depending on agents’ characteristics; or for the fact that for different
agents the relative number of market opportunities may differ. From expression (A.1) it is clear that
what we adopt is a choice model; choice, however, is constrained by the number and the
characteristics of jobs in the opportunity set. Therefore the model is also compatible with the case of
involuntary unemployment, i.e. an opportunity set that does not contain any market opportunity.
Besides this extreme case, the number and the characteristics of market (and non-market)
opportunities in general vary from individual to individual. Even if the set of market opportunities is
not empty, in some cases it might contain very few elements and/or elements with bad characteristics.
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We assume that the utility function can be factorized as
(A.2) ( ) ( )( , ), , ( , ), ( , , )U f wh m h j V f wh m h h w jε=
where V and ε are the systematic and the stochastic component respectively, and ε  is i.i.d. according
to:
(A.3) ( ) ( )1Pr expu uε −≤ = −
The term ε is a random taste-shifter which accounts for the effect on utility of all the characteristics of
the household-job match which are observed by the household but not by us. We observe the chosen h
and w. Therefore we can specify the probability that the agent chooses a job with observed
characteristics (h,w). It can be shown that under the assumptions (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) we can write
the probability density function of a choice (h,w) as follows6:
(A.4) ( )( )
( , ), ( , )( , )
( , ), ( , )
= ∫∫
qz
V f wh m h p h w
h w
V f zq m q p q z dqdz
ϕ
Expression (A.4) is analogous to the continuous multinomial logit developed in the transportation and
location analysis literature. The intuition behind expression (A.4) is that the probability of a choice
(h,w) can be expressed as the relative attractivenessweighted by a measure of “availability”
( ),p h w of jobs of type (h,w). More details on the derivation of (A.4) can be found in Aaberge et al.
(1999).
From (A.4) we also see that this approach does not suffer from the complexity of the tax rule
f. The tax rule, however complex, enters the expression as it is, and there is no need to simplify it in
order to make it differentiable or manageable as in the traditional approach. The crucial difference is
that in the traditional approach the functions representing household behavior are derived on the basis
of a comparison of marginal variations of utility, while in the approach that we follow a comparison of
levels of utility is directly involved.
In order to estimate the model we choose convenient but still flexible parametric forms for V
and p(h,w). The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. The likelihood function is the
6 See Aaberge et al. (1999).
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product of the choice densities (A.4) for every household in the sample. We refer to Aaberge et al.
(1998, 2001) for the estimated parameters7.
Once the parameters have been estimated, we can simulate the effects of different tax rules.
Then we can evaluate the effect of a new rule f* by solving the new problem:
(A.5) ( ) ( )( ) ( )*, ,max , , , , , .h w j BV f wh m h j h w jε∈
As a practical matter, the simulation procedure works as follows. First, for each household we
simulate the opportunity set with 200 points: one is the chosen alternative, the other 199 are built by
drawing from the estimated ( , )p h w density. Second, for each household and each point in the
opportunity set we draw a value ε from the distribution (A.3). Third, for each household we solve
problem (A.5).
For further details on the empirical specification and the estimation results we refer to
Aaberge et al. (1998, 1999, 2001).
7 In Aaberge et al. (1998) the model is estimated on a sample containing only couples. The estimates for singles have been
expressly produced for the present paper, and can be obtained upon request.
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Appendix B
The dataset
The estimation and the simulation of the model is based on data from the 1993 Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW93). This survey is conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy and,
besides household and individual socio-demographic characteristics, contains detailed information on
labour, income and wealth of each household component.
The sample that we select contains 4827 individuals (2160 couples, 310 single females and
206 single males). Singles and couples with income from self-employment are excluded from the
sample: this is because their decision process may be substantially different from wage employees’
and typically involves a permanent element of uncertainty.
We have restricted the ages of the individuals to be between 18 and 54 in order to minimize
the inclusion in the sample of individuals who in principle are eligible for retirement, since the current
version of the model does not take the retirement decision into account.
Due to the above selection rules, the estimates and the simulations should be interpreted as
conditional upon the decisions not to be self-employed and not to retire.
The labour incomes measured by the survey are net of social security contributions and of
taxes on personal income. Therefore, in order to compute gross incomes we have to apply the
“inverse” tax code. In turn, the “direct” tax code has to be applied to every point in each household’s
choice set to compute disposable income associated with that point. Hourly wage rates are obtained by
dividing gross annual wage income by observed hours.
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Appendix C
The Italian 1993 tax rule
Here we summarise the main features of the personal income tax system in 1993. The unit of taxation
is the individual. To the individual total taxable income, the following marginal tax rates are applied:
Income (1000 LIT) Marginal tax rate (per cent)
Up to 7,200 10
7,200 - 14,400 22
14,400 – 30,000 27
30,000 – 60,000 34
60,000 – 150,000 41
150,000 – 300,000 46
Over 300,000 51
Some expenditures (such as medical or insurance) can be deducted from income before applying
taxes. Child allowances and dependent spouse allowancesup to the amount of the gross taxcan be
subtracted from the tax. Conditional on the number of household members and household total
income, the head of the household receives family benefits.
